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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 20000676-CA
Priority No. 2
(DEFENDANT IS INCARCERATED)

:

COREY CHATELAIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(e)
involving an appeal from a Court of Record in a criminal case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NUMBER ONE: THE RULE 11 REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RELATED TO THE ADVICE OF RIGHTS TO
A DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE COURT ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA WERE
DEFICIENT AND THEREFORE PLAIN ERROR REQUIRES WITHDRAWAL OF
DEFENDANTS' GUILTY PLEA.
The standard of review on appeal is to determine whether plain error exists.
State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Ut 1998). In State v. Ostler 2000 UT App. 028 U 23,
996 P.2d 1065 and State v. Tamawiecki 2000 UT App. 186 U18,397 Utah Adv. Rep.

13, this court held that all of the technical requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure related to the advice of rights to a defendant prior to or in
connection with his guilty plea, must be met, failing which, the defendant may have
his guilty plea withdrawn, even if untimely.
This issue was preserved by defendant filing his Motion and Memorandum to
Set Aside his Sentence and Permit his Withdrawal of Plea. (RECORD 034-046).
ISSUE NUMBER TWO: EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED
WHICH SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA.
The standard of review on appeal is to determine whether exceptional
circumstances exist. State v. Man/in, 964 P.2d 313, 317-18 (Ut 1998) (indicating
that appellate courts will review a claim that a plea should be withdrawn which is
raised for the first time on appeal if exceptional circumstances or plain error exists).
To establish plain error, a defendant must show that:
i.

An error exists;

ii.

The error should have been obvious to the trial court;

iii.

The error is harmful. State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 318 (quoting State

v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Ut 1993).
The exceptional circumstances concept serves as safety device to assure that
manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Ut App. 1996).
This issue was preserved by defendant orally requesting permission to
2

withdraw his guilty plea based on exceptional circumstances prior to his sentence.
(SENTENCING T3-4). Defendant also subsequently filed a formal Motion and
Memorandum requesting withdrawal of his guilty plea based on exceptional
circumstances. (RECORD 034-046).
ISSUE NUMBER THREE:
WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD
OVERRULE ITS DECISION IN STATE V. PRICE, 837 P.2d 578 (Ut App. 1992)
THAT THE 30-DAY RULE OF UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) IS
JURISDICTIONAL AND RUNS FROM THE DATE OF THE PLEA HEARING.
The standard of review permits this Court to consider its previous decisions
and determine whether circumstances exist that would further require this Court to
review defendant's claim on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Ut App. 1996).
This issue was also preserved by defendant having filed his Motion and
Memorandum in Support of his Request to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. (RECORD
034-046).
STATUTORY PROVISION
As part of defendant's requested relief, he is asking this Court to overrule its
decision in State v. Price supra, and interpret §77-13-6(2)(b) to run from the date of
sentencing and final judgment, rather than on the date of the plea proceeding. That
statute provides:
77-13-6.
(1)
(2)

Withdrawal of plea.
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to
conviction.
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court.
3

(3)

(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is
made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after
the entry of the plea.
This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned
person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is an appeal from a final Order of the Court denying defendant's Motion

to Withdraw his Guilty Plea.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
The defendant was charged with two counts of automobile homicide, each a

second degree felony and two class A misdemeanor counts of driving under the
influence of alcohol.
On April 19, 2000, the defendant appeared before the Honorable Michael J.
Glasmann and entered a plea of guilty to one count of automobile homicide, a
second degree felony and one class A misdemeanor, driving under the influence of
alcohol. The other counts were dismissed.
Sentencing was set for June 7, 2000.
On June 5, 2000, the defendant received a notice from the General Motors
Corporation informing him that General Motors had decided that a defect existed in
the ABS braking system for certain vehicles, one of which was the vehicle that had
been driven by the defendant at the time of this accident. The recall notice informed
him that a malfunctioning switch in the ABS braking system may send an incorrect
4

signal to the ABS module which would result in a somewhat longer stopping distance
during an ABS stop.
Based upon this recall notice, on the day scheduled for his sentencing, the
defendant requested the court to postpone his sentence to allow him sufficient time
to file a motion to withdraw his previously entered guilty plea. This motion was
denied by the court on the grounds that more than 30 days had elapsed since the
defendant had entered his guilty plea and that the time limit was jurisdictional. The
court also concluded there were no circumstances under which the defendant could
be permitted to withdraw his plea. The court proceeded with sentencing and
sentenced the defendant to a one to 15 year term in the Utah State Prison.
At the conclusion of the sentence hearing, the defendant requested the court
to permit him to remain in the Weber County Jail to allow him sufficient time to file
a formal motion to set aside the sentence and withdraw his plea. This was granted
and the defendant filed that motion.
III.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.
A hearing was conducted on this motion on July 5,2000 before the Honorable

W. Brent West. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion. The
Court affirmed its prior sentencing and required defendant to begin serving his one
to 15 year term in the Utah State Prison. Formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order denying the motion were entered by the court on July 28, 2000. The
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are attached as part of the
5

addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The police were notified of a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of 31 st
Street and Parker Drive at 6:53 p.m. on January 12, 2000. (PRELIM T7).
Where this accident occurred, 31st Street goes westbound and Parker Drive
is a left turn intersection governed by a red light. (PRELIM T7& 8). Officer Mills, the
initial officer on the scene, first noticed the paramedics running toward the vehicle
occupied by Tiffany Warner and Paul Delacruz. There were four vehicles involved
in this accident. Vehicle No. 1 was a 1991 GMC Jimmy driven by the defendant. He
was going westbound and rear-ended vehicle No. 2, the vehicle driven by Tiffany
Warner in which Paul Delacruz was a passenger. Vehicle No. 2 in turn rear-ended
vehicle No. 3, a vehicle driven by Sally Boucher which in turn rear-ended vehicle No.
4, driven by John Lowe. (PRELIM T8).
Officer Mills determined that Mr. Chatelain was the driver of the rear vehicle
of this four-car accident and requested his driver's license, insurance and
registration. (PRELIM T9&10).
Mr. Chatelain initially produced his VISA card for his driver's license but
subsequently produced his driver's license, registration and insurance and went with
Officer Mills to his police vehicle. (PRELIM T10).
Although Officer Mills had not been trained in any accident reconstruction,
(PRELIM T14), he determined what he believed to be a point of impact (PRELIM
6

T16) and from that point concluded that the Warner vehicle was pushed 55.4 feet to
the west as a result of the collision. (PRELIM T15).
Officer Mills testified there were no skid marks between what he determined
was the point of impact and the resulting location of the Warner vehicle. (PRELIM
T16). (Sic. He probably meant there were no skid marks leading up to the point of
impact). Officer Mills acknowledged that the was not aware whether Mr. Chatelain's
vehicle had ABS brakes. He made no inquiry concerning that. He acknowledged
that if ABS brakes were on Mr. Chatelain's vehicle, it would not leave skid marks, but
brake marks would be apparent. He was not able to articulate what brake marks
were if they were not skid marks. (PRELIM T20-22). He also admitted that since
he had not considered the Chatelain vehicle as having ABS brakes, he did not
consider ABS braking as a possibility and was really looking for skid marks.
(PRELIM T22 &23).
Officer Mills testified that he parked his police vehicle approximately 50 to 75
feet east of what he determined to be the point of impact. (PRELIM T30). While
accompanying Mr. Chatelain to his police vehicle, Officer Mills noticed nothing
unusual about Mr. Chatelain's gait. He was able to detect the odor of alcohol and
subsequently turned Mr. Chatelain over to Officer Hunt to perform driving under the
influence tests. (PRELIM T31).
Officer Hunt performed standard DUI physical agility tests and made initial
observations and concluded that Mr. Chatelain was impaired and shouldn't be
7

driving and placed him under arrest. (PRELIM T34-36).
Officer Hunt performed an intoxilyzer test on Mr. Chatelain with breath test
results of .220. (PRELIM T38).

A blood draw was also requested and the

toxicology report showed blood alcohol of .25%. (PRELIM T39-40).
Although there was some dispute as to the evidence of Mr. Chatelain's speed
at the point of impact, the posted speed limit for where the accident occurred was
55 MPH.

(PRELIM T44) and no evidence suggested that Mr. Chatelain was

exceeding the speed limit.
Officer Hunt testified that when he arrived at the scene, he parked
approximately 20 to 30 feet behind the Chatelain vehicle (PRELIM T48) which
would have placed his vehicle either over the point of impact as determined by
Officer Mills or somewhere between the point of impact and the Chatelain vehicle
thereby interfering with the accident investigation area.
At the preliminary hearing, it was stipulated that Tiffany Warner died because
of head injuries.1 At the time of her death, she was pregnant and as a result, her
fetus died as well. It was also stipulated that her passenger, Paul Delacruz, was
injured as was Sally Boucher, the driver of vehicle No. 3. (PRELIM T4&5).
Mr. Chatelain was charged with four counts. Count I & Count II were charged

1

According to the medical examiner's report, Ms. Warner died as a result of a
closed head injury. The impact of the accident caused a stereo speaker which was
sitting loose in the back of her car to fly forward striking her in the head which resulted
in her death. (Sentencing T2).
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as second degree automobile homicides for Tiffany Warner and her fetus. Count III
and Count IV were charged as DUI with injury, Class A misdemeanors. (RECORD
001-004).
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss
the second degree felony charges on the grounds that the State had failed to
produce a prima facie case of criminal negligence. Defendant's counsel requested
an opportunity to present a Memorandum in Support of that motion. The matter was
scheduled for further argument and decision for April 25, 2000. (PRELIM T61).
Rather than pursue the Motion to Dismiss, defendant subsequently decided
to agree to a bind over and agreed to enter a plea to one of the second degree
felony charges and one of the Dill's and the remaining two counts were to be
dismissed. (PLEAT2).
On April 19, 2000, the defendant appeared before the Honorable Michael J.
Glasmann to enter his pleas according to the negotiations with the County Attorney.
Prior to accepting the pleas, Judge Glasmann went through the following Rule 11
advice of rights with Mr. Chatelain.
"The Court:

Again, the negotiation, let me just make sure I understand

it Mr. Florence, is that he would plead to automobile homicide and one count of
driving under the influence of alcohol?
Mr. Florence:

That's correct.

9

The Court: Is there anything else to the negotiation?
Mr. Florence:

No, your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Chatelain, has anything else been promised to you that ought
to be disclosed at this time to the Court?
The Defendant:

No, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Do you speak, read and write the English Language?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you have a clear mind today?
The Defendant: Yes sir.
The Court: Are you under the influence of any alcohol or drugs?
The Defendant:

No, sir.

The Court: Are you under the influence of any medications that would be
clouding your thinking at this time?
The Defendant:

No, sir.

The Court: Do you understand that you don't have to plead guilty; that you
have the right to go to trial before a judge or a jury?
The Defendant: Yes, I do.
The Court: If you chose to do that you could confront and cross-examine the
State's witnesses against you, you could call witnesses of your own and you could
also testify but you cannot be made to testify against yourself and that's because you
10

have a right against self-incrimination, do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Also if you went to trial and you were then convicted, you could
appeal from what had occurred during that trial. If you give up your right to a trial,
you are going to give up that right of appeal, does that make sense?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. You are presumed to be innocent. In order for the State
to prove your guilt it must prove each element of the offense that you are charged
with beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under Count I, the State would have to prove that on January the 12th of 2000,
that you committed a second degree felony, automobile homicide. They would have
to prove that you operated a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08 percent or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug
with a combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which rendered you
incapable of safely operating a vehicle and that you caused the death of Tiffany
Warner by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner. Do you
understand what the State would have to prove?
The Defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Under Count III, the State would have to prove that you committed
a Class A Misdemeanor, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. And

11

basically they would have to prove that you were in actual physical (sic) of a motor
vehicle, that you were under the influence of alcohol or drugs or some combination
of them to the point that it impaired your ability to safely operate the vehicle, and that
as a proximate result of operating such vehicle in a negligent manner that you
inflicted injury upon Paul Delacruz, that's taken from Count III. Do you understand
what the State would have to prove under that count?
The Defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Does the State want to state anything further by way of a factual
basis?
Ms. Neider:

Yes, Judge. I think it would be important for the Court to

note that it's the State's position that the criminal negligence in this case was that he
was driving approximately 50 miles an hour. The three cars that were struck were
stopped at a red light in a turning lane, he hit the back, the third vehicle which was
the vehicle that Tiffany Warner was in and Mr. Delacruz was in. She did suffer head
injuries that caused her death and Mr. Delacruz did have some physical injuries.
She - I'm sorry, the defendant did some alcohol tests subsequently and the test was
a .25 - - or .22 on the breathalyser and .25 on the blood draw.
The Court: Do you understand that's what the State claims it could prove in
this case?
The Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
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The Court: Are you pleading guilty to these two counts because you are in
fact guilty?
The Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: And is the description that I have just been given and what I
describe by way of the charging documents from the State, is that an accurate
description of what happened?
Mr. Florence:

I think there's some disagreement as to the speed he was

traveling when the accident happened, but to the extent that we feel confident the
State could prove criminal negligence we do ~ he does acknowledge that. So other
than that modest - - it's just a factual disagreement.
The Court: Is that correct, Mr. Chatelain?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Is anyone threatening you to cause you to plead guilty today?
The Defendant:

No, your Honor.

The Court: Do you understand that the maximum penalty for the second
degree felony which is what is in Count I, the automobile homicide, that the
maximum penalty is one to 15 years at the state prison and up to a $10,000 fine?
The Defendant: Yes, I do.
The Court: That the maximum penalty for the Class A Misdemeanor, which
is Count III and that's the DUI with the injury, that the maximum penalty is a year in
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jail and up to a $2,500 fine?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. Have you have an adequate chance to talk with your
attorney, Mr. Florence, about what you are doing today?
The Defendant: Yes, I have.
The Court: Do you have any questions either for him or for me as the judge
before you plead guilty to these charges?
The Defendant:

No, sir.

The Court: I'll ask you then as to Count I, a second degree felony, automobile
homicide, how do you plead?
The Defendant:

Guilty, your Honor.

The Court: That was guilty, was it?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: As to Count III, a Class A misdemeanor, driving a vehicle under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, how do you plead?
The Defendant:

Guilty, your Honor.

The Court: The Court finds that you've knowingly and voluntarily entered
those two pleas. Does the State move to dismiss Counts II and IV?
Ms. Corp: Yes, Judge.
The Court: Counts II and IV are dismissed. You have 30 days from today

14

within which to file a motion to withdraw the pleas you've just entered. Filing that
motion doesn't mean it would be granted but if you don't file it in 30 days it's not
timely, do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, sir. (PLEAT3-8).
The probation department asked that the matter be continued for sentencing
until May 31, 2000. Because of a conflict with defendant's counsel, defendant
requested that the matter be set either the week before or the week after that and
accordingly, it was scheduled for sentencing for June 7, 2000. (PLEA T8-9).
Before the date scheduled for the sentence, Judge Glasmann resigned from
the bench and so on June 7, 2000, the defendant appeared before the Honorable W.
Brent West for sentencing.
Two days prior to his sentencing, Mr. Chatelain received a notice from
General Motors corporation indicating they had detected a defect in their ABS
module and braking systems and were recalling all vehicles with that module in
place including the vehicle that Mr. Chatelain was driving at the time of the accident.
(SENTENCING T2). Mr. Chatelain didn't open the recall notice until the day after he
received it (the day before sentencing). Between then and the time for the
sentencing, defendant attempted to check with the recall program to determine
whether or not they could indicate precisely whether the module in Mr. Chatelain's
vehicle was defective. He was told they could not. (SENTENCING T2). The recall
notice specifically stated:
15

"Reason For This Recall: General Motors has decided that a defect
which relates to motor vehicle safety exists in certain 1991-1996 4wheel drive (4WD) Jimmys and 1994-1996 4WD Sonoma pickup trucks.
Some of these vehicles exhibit a condition in which a switch that signals
the antilock brake system (ABS) module when the vehicle is in 4WD
may malfunction. The ABS module is designed with two different
operating algorithms: one for two-wheel drive (2WD) operation and
another for 4WD drive operation. This allows the ABS system to
compensate for the braking torque applied to the rear wheels through
the drivetrain when the vehicle is in 4WD drive. When the vehicle is in
2WD, a malfunctioning switch may send an incorrect signal to the ABS
module. If this occurs during an ABS stop, a somewhat longer stopping
distance could result. If this occurred when minimum stopping distance
was required, it could result in a vehicle crash." (SENTENCING T3)
(RECORD 028).
Because of this notice and because the evidence at the preliminary hearing
may well have been consistent with a defective braking system, defendant asked to
postpone the sentencing and allow him an additional two days to file a formal motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. (SENTENCING T4).
The Court denied the request on the basis that the 30 days to withdraw a plea
was jurisdictional (SENTENCING T14) and the court was going to proceed with the
sentence.
Defendant's counsel then asked the Court to continue the sentencing so that
the Adult Probation and Parole Department could at least take the factor of the recall
notice into consideration as a possible mitigating circumstance, something that they
were not previously aware of. (SENTENCING T16). The Court denied that request
as well. (SENTENCING T16).
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The Court sentenced Mr. Chatelain to serve an indeterminate term of one to
15 years at the Utah State Prison and imposed a one year sentence in the Weber
County Jail on the DUI class A misdemeanor which was to run concurrent with the
prison term. (SENTENCING T39).
The defendant requested a stay of the imposition of the sentence to allow him
time to file a formal written motion. That was denied. (SENTENCING T40-42).
Defendant then asked that he be held in the Weber County jail rather than
being transferred to prison until he had time to file the formal motion and have a
hearing. The Court granted that request and ordered that the motion be submitted
within ten days absent which defendant would be transported to the prison.
(SENTENCING T42).
The defendant then timely filed his motion to set aside the sentence and
permit withdrawal of plea or alternatively for a new trial. (RECORD 034-046). The
hearing on that motion was held on July 5, 2000. After argument of counsel, the
Court again ruled that the 30-day period to withdraw a plea was jurisdictional and the
Court was precluded from even addressing a motion to withdraw the plea.
(HEARING T10).
Defendant's motion and supporting memorandum also raised Rule 11
deficiencies claiming that Judge Glasmann had failed to follow the technical
requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judge West
concluded that he could not consider that argument in that the plain error doctrine
17

relied on by defendant was an appellate doctrine and not available to a trial court.
(HEARING T12).
The Judge denied all motions and the defendant was ordered to be transferred
to prison. (HEARING T14).
Formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the motions
were prepared by the State and signed by the Court on July 28, 2000. (RECORD
067-068).
The defendant filed this appeal.
The defendant is presently incarcerated in the Utah State prison. He has not
requested or filed a Certificate of Probable Cause. He has knowingly elected to
begin his sentence pending this appeal. He did not want to remain at liberty with his
future uncertain pending the appeal knowing that rejection would require his
immediate incarceration. He hopes that this appeal will be heard timely, his request
will be granted and he can thereafter present his defense at trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plain error and exceptional circumstances require that defendant's plea be
vacated. The plain error is based on the Court's failure to comply with the technical
requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The exceptional circumstances are based upon General Motors recall notice
of the ABS braking system. This was previously undiscovered and undiscoverable
evidence which defendant only learned of more than 30 days after the entry of his
18

plea but prior to his sentence. It would be manifestly unjust to allow defendant's plea
to stand where this evidence would likely produce a result different from the finding
of guilty based on defendant's plea.
Although defendant's plea can be vacated based upon a plain error or
exceptional circumstances review, the plea can also be vacated by this court
overruling its decision in State v. Price, 837 P.2D 578 (Ut App. 1992) and holding
that the 30-day limit for withdrawing guilty pleas found in Utah Code Ann.§77-136(2)(b) (1995) begins to run when judgment of conviction is entered and is not
jurisdictional.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NUMBER ONE: THE RULE 11 REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RELATED TO THE ADVICE OF
RIGHTS TO A DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE COURT ACCEPTING A GUILTY
PLEA, WERE DEFICIENT AND THEREFORE PLAIN ERROR REQUIRES
WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANTS' GUILTY PLEA.
While Mr. Chatelain's motion to set aside his plea was pending, the Court of
Appeals decided State v. Tamawiecki 2000 UT App. 186, 397 Utah Adv. Rep. 13
and reaffirmed the holding of State v. Ostler 2000 UT App. 028, 996 P.2d 1065.
Both cases reiterated earlier holdings that the Court's failure to comply with the
technical requirements of Rule 11 constitute plain error and a defendant should be
allowed to have his guilty plea withdrawn even if not timely made.
Pursuant to Rule 11, the Court may not accept a plea until it has found that:

19

"if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she
has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel";
"the plea is voluntarily made;"
"the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury,
the right to confront and cross-examine in open the court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the
plea, these rights are waived."
"the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the
plea is an admission of all those elements";
"there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction";
"the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences";
" if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion
and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;"
"the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing
any motion to withdraw the plea;" and
"the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is
20

limited".
See Ostler at M 9.
Judge Glasmann did not inform Mr. Chatelain of his "right to a speedy public
trial before an impartial jury." Instead, Judge Glasmann said "do you understand you
don't have to plead guilty, that you have the right to go to trial before a judge or jury."
(PLEA T4).
Judge Glasmann did not tell Mr. Chatelain that he had the "right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses." Instead, he said "you could call witnesses of your
own". (PLEAT4).
Judge Glasmann failed to inform the defendant that by entering a guilty plea,
he was waiving all of the rights referred to above. (PLEA T2-6).
The Court may not accept a plea until it has found that the defendant
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered and
that the plea is an admission of all of those elements. While Judge Glasmann
articulated the elements of the charges to which Mr. Chatelain would plead guilty,
he did not tell him that the plea is an admission of all of those elements. (PLEA T26).
The Court must also advise a defendant of the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences. Judge Glasmann failed to do this. (PLEA T2-6).
Strict compliance rather than substantial compliance, with Rule 11 is required
when accepting a guilty plea. State v. Tarnawiecki at 1J12 citing State v. Maguire.
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830 P.2d 216, 217 (Ut 1991).
In Tamawiecki, the Court said that while "a rigid colloquy or rote recitation of
the elements of Rule 11 is not required . . . Rule 11 (e) requires the trial court during
the plea colloquy to find that the seven detailed and specific criteria have been
fulfilled. Citing State v. Visser 1999 UT App. 19, H 14, 973 P.2d 998, cert, granted
982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999). In Visser, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea based upon the failure
to advise defendant of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury.
At oral argument before the Court of Appeals in Tamawiecki, the State
attempted to distinguish Tamawiecki from Ostler based upon the difference in the
quantum of error. The Court dismissed the quantum argument and said that a strict
compliance of Rule 11 is mandated. See fl 19.
ISSUE NUMBER TWO: EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED
WHICH SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA.
In the case of State v. Price 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of
Appeals discussed in substantial detail the timeliness of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea. In Price, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea
31 days after the entry of his guilty plea. Although the issue was not raised at the
trial court level, the question was whether or not the state could raise the
untimeliness argument for the first time on appeal.
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In considering the timeliness argument, the appellate court compared the time
limitations of §77-13-6 (2)(b) to other time limitations of jurisdictional stature. For
example, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure state that a notice of
appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of
judgment. Notwithstanding that jurisdictional language, the rule also provides that
trial courts, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause may extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal.
Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure also contain unconditional
jurisdictional language but with similar exception qualifying language.
In Price, the court stated that although Rules 4 and 48 contain provisions
allowing courts to extend jurisdictional time limits, those provisions did not destroy
the jurisdictional nature of those time limits and that the defendant must still comply
with the requirement.
In Price, the court concluded that the timeliness of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea as provided for §77-13-6(2)(b) was, in fact, jurisdictional and accordingly,
the state could raise it for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, the Price appellate
court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Of significance however, is that in Price the appellate court stated that "a trial
court may abuse its discretion by failing to set aside a guilty plea in light of new
evidence." Citing State v. Mildenhall, 744 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987) and State v.
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Galleaos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1987). Although the new facts presented in
Price were not sufficient to set aside his plea, the clear implication was that if a
defendant's motion is based up new and previously undiscovered and
undiscoverable evidence, a judge may abuse discretion by failing to grant the
motion, even if it were beyond the 30-day time limit.
Virtually all of the cases which have addressed the issue of the jurisdictional
nature of the 30-day period within which a defendant is permitted to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, have, in addition to the plain error doctrine, referred to
"exceptional circumstances" as a basis for permitting a defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea even if untimely. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Ut App. 1996); State v.
Marvin. 964 P.2d 313 (Ut 1998); State v. Ostler 2000 UT App. 028, 996 P.2d 1065;
and State v. Tarnawiecki 2000 UT App. 186, 397 Utah Adv. Rep. 13.
The exceptional circumstances that exist in this case involved the recall notice
received by defendant two days prior to the date set for his sentence and more than
30 days after he had entered his plea. This is evidence that was not previously
known or discoverable and under the facts of this case should have been considered
to be so exceptional as to permit defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.
At defendant's sentencing hearing, the State argued that evidence of defective
ABS brakes in defendant's vehicle would have made no difference in the outcome
had the matter gone to trial. With that, defendant takes exception.
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Automobile homicide, §76-5-207, is a second degree felony if the actor
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner while under the influence
of alcohol and causes the death of another. Is a third degree felony if the operation
of the vehicle is in a negligent manner. Both felonies require the death of another
person and both felonies require a showing that the actor was driving under the
influence of alcohol. Both felonies require some degree of negligence. In theory,
a person could operate a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and be
involved in an accident resulting in the death of another and if the actor were free of
any negligence, he/she would not be in violation of the automobile homicide statute.
Therefore, something more than being under the influence of alcohol and being in
an accident which causes the death of another, is required. Some level of
negligence above and beyond the intoxication must be present before one is in
violation of the automobile homicide statute. If the level of negligence is simple
negligence, the actor is then subject to the provisions of a third degree felony. If the
actor is criminally negligent, he/she is subject to the provisions of the second degree
felony.
Prior to the information received from General Motors Corporation concerning
the possibility of a malfunctioning ABS braking system, there was no reason to
expect that defendant's braking system had in any way contributed to this accident.
Now, in light of this evidence, it is entirely plausible that a jury may conclude that
although the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of
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alcohol, he was not operating it in either a criminally negligent or a negligent manner.
It is also possible that the jury could conclude that in light of this new evidence, the
defendant was only operating his vehicle negligently but not with criminal
negligence, thereby exposing him only to the punishment of a third degree felony.
In this case, the only evidence of defendant's negligence was the fact that he
crashed into the back of the Warner vehicle. If the defendant is permitted to present
his evidence of the existence of the ABS braking system recall and engage in some
independent testing of the braking system, a jury may conclude that the reason for
the rear-end collision was the failure of the braking system, not any negligence of the
defendant. In point of fact, it isn't the defendant's burden to prove to the jury that the
brake failure was the cause of the accident, only that sufficient evidence exists that
the jury could not dismiss that possibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, it is likely that with this new evidence, a different result would have
been produced had defendant been permitted to go to trial.
ISSUE NUMBER THREE:
WHETHER
THIS
COURT
SHOULD
OVERRULE ITS DECISION IN STATE V. PRICE, 837 P.2D 578 ( UT APP. 1992)
THAT THE 30-DAY RULE OF UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-6(2)(B) (1995) IS
JURISDICTIONAL AND RUNS FROM THE DATE OF THE PLEA HEARING.
This issue was raised by the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association's office
in its original brief in the case of State v. Ostler 2000 UT App. 028, 996 P.2d 1065.
With respect to that issue, the Court of Appeals held that that issue was made
dispositive in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) holding that the Court
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of Appeals was bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and cannot overrule another
panel's ruling. At fl7.
With Ostler's conviction being vacated because of Rule 11 deficiencies, the
Attorney General's office filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari claiming the Ostler
holding related to plain error and exceptional circumstances was wrong and should
be reversed by the Supreme Court.
The Legal Defenders Association filed a cross-petition for Writ of Certiorari on
the issue of the Price decision not being overruled in Ostler. With permission of the
Legal Defenders Association, that issue and their arguments are re-raised here by
Mr. Chatelain. Rather than restate the entirety of the argument in the body of this
brief, defendant has attached as part of the addendum, the relevant pages of the Salt
Lake Legal Defenders Association's Cross-Petition in State v. Ostler. Certiorari is
still pending.
CONCLUSION
Defendant, Corey Chatelain, respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
guilty plea, that he be immediately released from incarceration and be permitted to
go to trial on the original charges.
Respectfully Submitted this H

day of September, 2000.

Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by Brian R. Florence, attorney for
defendant/appellant, that I served the attached Brief of Appellant herein, upon the
parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and causing the
same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on the }°\'—

day of September,

2000, to the following:
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0854

J(3Ann T. Florence, Legal Assistant
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ADDENDUM
1.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion
to Set Aside Sentence and Permit Withdrawal of Plea.

2.

A portion of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association's brief in
State v. Ostler cross-petition for Writ of Certiorari.
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CAMILLE L. NEIDER 7266
SANDRA L. CORP 4411
olillCT COURT
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FL$&RHJL 28 P 3- 21
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

' & * '

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW &
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SET ASIDE SENTENCE &
PERMIT WITHDRAWAL OF
PLEA OR ALTERNATIVELY
FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
COREY D. CHATELAIN,
Defendant.

Case No.001900281
Judge: W. BRENT WEST

On July 5, 2000, the Court heard arguments on Defendant's motions to withdraw his plea
or for a new trial. Defendant was present with counsel, Brian R. Florence. The State was
represented by Sandra L. Corp and Camille L. Neider, Deputy County Attorneys. Based upon the
written memoranda and oral arguments, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant pled guilty to Automobile Homicide, a second degree felony, and Driving a
Vehicle under the Influence of Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, on April 19, 2000 before Judge
Michael Glasmann.
2. On June 7, 2000, Defendant appeared before this Court for sentencing and made an
oral motion to withdraw his plea which was denied on that date.

3. The Court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen
years on the second degree felony and a concurrent term of one year in jail for the class A
misdemeanor on June 7,2000.
4. Defendant filed this motion on June 13, 2000, in writing.
5. Both the oral motion and the written motions to withdraw the plea were made more
than 30 days after entry of the plea.
6. No trial was held due to defendant's plea of guilty.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The provision in Section 77-13-6(2) allowing only 30 days after entry of a plea for a
motion to withdraw the plea is jurisdictional and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
merits of defendant's motions to withdraw his plea because they were filed more than 30 daysafter entry of the plea.
2. The Court cannot consider defendant's motion for a new trial because no trial was
held in this case.
3. There was no illegality in defendant's sentence allowing the Court to consider a
motion to correct an illegal sentence.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, defendant's motion is denied.
DATED this

tt

day of July, 2000.

Approved as to form this n

infer.,
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Defendant

*.&>&•
W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

Tab 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

Sup. Ct. No.

CHRISTOPHER BLAIN OSTLER,

:

Ct. App. No. 981308-CA

Defendant/Respondent.

:

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
AND ALTERNATIVE CROSS-PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOAN C. WATT (3967)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
J. KEVIN MURPHY
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent

for a plain error review on direct appeal.
The Court of Appeals made no change in existing law, let alone the sweeping
changes claimed by the state, when it vacated Ostler's pleas based on plain error. The
Court of Appeals correctly decided this issue and vacated Ostler's unconstitutional pleas.
Issue presented in Petition and By Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari4
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN STATE V. PRICE
HOLDING THAT THE THIRTY DAY RULE OF SECTION 77-13-6(2¥b)
IS JURISDICTIONAL AND RUNS FROM THE PLEA HEARING
RATHER THAN JUDGMENT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.
Ostler filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas less than thirty days after
judgment was entered. The trial judge denied that motion on the grounds that the motion
was not timely under Section 77-13-6(2)(b) and Price, which held that the thirty day
period runs from the date of the plea hearing and is jurisdictional. Price, 837 P.2d at 58284.5 Assuming Price is incorrectly decided and the thirty day period actually runs from the
4

While Respondent believes certiorari review is unnecessary, should the Court
disagree, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court examine the Court of Appeals'
decision in Price as part of any review conducted in this case.
5

Ostler argued in the Court of Appeals that exceptional circumstances required
that Price should be overruled. The Court of Appeals refused to reach Ostler's claim
based on that Court's misreading of State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993).
Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^7. According to the Ostler panel, Thurman precludes a panel
of that Court from ever overruling another panel of that Court. Id, While Thurman
clarifies that the doctrine ofstare decisis applies to panels of the Court of Appeals, it does
not preclude a panel from overruling another panel when the doctrine of stare decisis is
followed. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1269. Pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, a panel
of the Court of Appeals can overrule another panel if the party attacking the decision
sustains the heavy burden of demonstrating that "'the decision is clearly erroneous or
12

entry of judgment or is not jurisdictional, Ostler's pleas can also be vacated on the grounds
that the trial judge incorrectly denied his motion to withdraw his plea.
The parties in Price supplied the Court of Appeals with very little analysis as to
whether Section 77-13-6(2)(b) is jurisdictional; in addition, neither party addressed
whether "entry of the plea" occurred at the plea hearing or when judgment of conviction
was entered. The Court of Appeals concluded that motions to withdraw guilty pleas are
similar to notices of appeal or petitions for certiorari and the time limit is therefore
jurisdictional; additionally, the Court simply assumed that the time ranfromthe plea
hearing. See Price, 837 P.2d at 582-83. The language of the statute, legislative history,
statutes, rules, case law, and the constitutional guarantees of separation of powers and
open courts establish that the thirty day period of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is a nonjurisdictional period which begins to run when judgment is entered.
A. THE THIRTY DAY PERIOD RUNS FROM FINAL JUDGMENT
RATHER THAN FROM THE DATE OF THE PLEA COLLOQUY.
The "fundamental consideration" and ,f[t]his Court's primary responsibility in
construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature." American Coal Co.
v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds. State v. South. 924

conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" State v.
DeCorso. 1999 UT 57, H83, 993 P.2d 837 (citation omitted). While this Court is not
constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis in examining an opinion of a lower court, it
nevertheless should clarify, as a threshold matter, that the Court of Appeals could have
overruled Price in this extreme circumstance where the decision was clearly erroneous.
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P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). While ordinarily courts interpret statutes according to their plain
language, courts go behind the plain language and look to the legislative intent when (1)
the language of the statute is ambiguous, or (2) a plain reading of the statute "is
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of
the statute." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,1292 (Utah 1996). The
legislature intended that the 30 day provision of section 77-13-6(2)(b) run from the date
judgment was entered. See Senate Debate, January 24, 1981 (Senate Bill 81) ( "this
b i l l . . . would indicate that a person may withdraw their guilty plea only within 30 days
after they entered that plea and there has been a final disposition...

.) (emphasis added).

The term "entry of the plea" in Section 77-13-6(2)(b) is ambiguous and could refer
to entering or accepting a plea at a plea proceeding or the more technical "entry" of a plea
that occurs when the judgment of conviction is entered. Review of legislative history to
determine when the thirty days begins to run is therefore appropriate.
In addition, even if the term "entry of the plea" were not ambiguous, legislative
history should be considered since the Price rule is "confused, inoperable, and in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of the statute." See Perrine, 911 P.2d at 1292.
Because Utah R. Crim P. 22(a) allows defendants to be sentenced more than 30 days after
the plea hearing, the Price interpretation creates situations where a trial judge who
otherwise has jurisdiction over a case is unable.to hear a meritorious motion to withdraw
which is filed more than 30 days after the plea hearing but prior to entry of judgment.
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Although trial courts are required to liberally grant pre-sentence motions to withdraw
guilty pleas (State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040,1042 (Utah 1987); State v. Jennings. 875
P.2d 566, 569 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1992)),
they are precluded from even hearing those motion in many cases. If Section 77-136(2)(b) were properly interpreted to runfromthe entry ofjudgment, this problem would
not occur.
The rule that a trial judge who otherwise has jurisdiction over a case cannot hear a
meritorious motion to withdraw a plea is contrary to the basic concept of jurisdiction.
When a court has jurisdiction over a case, it has jurisdiction to hear all matters relating to
the controversy, and to take all actions necessary to fully and fairly hear the case. See
Robinson v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n., 932 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Okl. 1997)
(citation omitted). It is inconsistent for a court to have jurisdiction over a case but to be
unable to hear a meritorious motion concerning the case. The confused, inoperable and
inconsistent nature of the Price interpretation is emphasized by the fact that Utah is the
only jurisdiction which deprives a trial judge of authority to withdraw a guilty plea prior to
sentencing. See Addendum D.
The Price interpretation fails to recognize the pivotal role of sentencing in a
criminal case. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(3) (1999) (conviction means judgment
by court after verdict or plea); 77-18a-l (1999) (appeal of rightfromjudgment of
conviction); Utah R. App. P. 4 (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of
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judgment); Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (motion for new trial must be made within 10 days after
judgment). Allowing a defendant to move to withdraw a guilty plea at any time prior to
sentencing and for up to thirty days after sentencing is consistent with these other
provisions and recognizes the pivotal role played by sentencing in a criminal case.
The Price interpretation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is also in contravention of the
express purpose of the statute. The statute is aimed at precluding defendants from filing
motions to withdraw their pleas years after judgment; it is not aimed at removing a trial
court's authority to hear meritorious motions to withdraw in cases which are otherwise
before it. While the Price rule does prevent motions made several years down the road
from being heard, it goes too far by also preventing motions which are filed before
sentencing and by precluding trial courtsfrommanaging the cases before them in a fair
and efficient manner.
Since the legislative history demonstrates that the thirty day period was intended to
runfromthe date on which a guilty plea is entered as a judgment of conviction and not
from the plea colloquy, the correct interpretation of the statute would be that the thirty day
period begins to run at entry ofjudgment. The Court of Appeals' assumption in Price that
the plea hearing rather than entry of judgment triggered the thirty day limit was incorrect
and should be overruled.
B. THE THIRTY DAY LIMIT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL.
A review of other statutes and rules indicates that Section 77-13-6(2)(b) does not
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create a jurisdictional bar. Courts retain jurisdiction to allow defendants to withdraw
guilty pleas which are conditional. Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) ; State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935
(Utah App. 1988). The amendment to Rule 1 l(i) and this Court's approval of the
withdrawal of such guilty pleas occurred after the decision in Price. See, e.g.. State v.
Rivera. 943 P.2d 1344,1345 (Utah 1997). Such pleas are conditioned upon a successful
appeal, and withdrawn more than thirty days after the plea colloquy. If section 77-136(2)(b) were jurisdictional, trial courts would be unable to withdraw conditional pleas.
In addition, statutes of limitations in criminal cases are not jurisdictional. James v.
Gajetka, 965 P.2d 567, 571-73 (Utah App. 1998). Since the time limit for initiating a case
can be waived, fairness requires that the period for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea in a case which is already before the trial court also is not absolute. Moreover, a
statute of limitations on filing a habeas petition cannot be used to bar a meritorious
petition without offending Utah's open courts provision in Utah Const. Article I,
section 11, due process and the separation of powers provision of Utah Const. Article V,
section 1. See Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249,253 (Utah 1998). Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2)(b) also "may not be constitutionally applied to bar" a meritorious motion to withdraw
a guilty plea. See id. Interpreting Section 77-13-6(2)(b) as not creating a jurisdictional
bar saves the statutefromthese infirmities.
While this Court has never directly addressed whether Section 77-13-6(2)(b) is
jurisdictional or whether the thirty days runfromthe plea hearing rather than entry of
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judgment, it has in dictum indicated that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed
within thirty days of entry of a plea or "the right is extinguished." State v. Abeyta, 852
P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). This statement adds nothing to the analysis of whether Section
77-13-6(2)(b) creates a jurisdictional bar since, in addition to being dictum, extinguishing
a defendant's right to file a motion is different from taking away a trial court's jurisdiction
to hear a motion. Moreover, Abeyta does not address whether a plea is "entered" for
purposes of Section 77-13-6(2)(b) at the plea hearing or when judgment is entered.
Contrary to the analysis in Price, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is unlike a
notice of appeal or petition for writ of certiorari since it does not initiate jurisdiction in a
higher court. The Court of Appeals' rationale for making the statute jurisdictional is
therefore not compelling. Moreover, a review of other statutes, case law and the function
served by Section 77-13-6(2)(b) demonstrates that the statute is not jurisdictional.
C. APPLICATION OF A THIRTY DAY JURISDICTIONAL PERIOD
WHICH RUNS FROM THE PLEA HEARING VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION.
Precluding a trial judgefromhearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea unless the
motion is filed within thirty days of the plea hearing violates the separation of powers and
open courts guarantees of the Utah Constitution. See Hurst 777 P.2d at 1033-34
(separation of powers and open courts provisions f,presuppose[] a judicial department
armed with process sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch of government."). In
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cases where a defendant files a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing but
more than thirty days after the plea hearing, a judge who otherwise has jurisdiction over
the case is unable to hear a meritorious motion to withdraw the plea pursuant to Price.
This limitation violates the Utah Constitution's guarantees of separation of powers and
access to open courts, and requires that the thirty day period of Section 77-13-6(2)(b) run
from the entry ofjudgment.
Like the four year statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions, the Price
interpretation of Section 77-13-6(2)(b) violates separation of powers and open courts
protection by removing "'flexibility and discretionfromstate judicial procedure, thereby
diminishing the court's ability to guarantee fairness and equity in particular cases." Julian.
966 P.2d at 253 (citing Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357,1368 n.18 (Utah App. 1993).
These protections require that a trial court which otherwise has jurisdiction over a case
have the power to fully hear and determine the controversy before it in order to fairly and
efficiently administer justice. Because the Price interpretation deprives trial courts of their
inherent power to fairly and efficiently control the cases before them, it violates the
separation of powers and open courts guarantees.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Respondent Christopher Blain Ostler respectfully requests that this
Court deny the state's petition for writ of certiorari. Alternatively, in the event this Court
determines that review of the decision in his case is warranted, Respondent respectfully
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